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Abstract
This article discusses the impact that the reforms of the European Union’s economic governance since 2011 have had on
the European Commission’s role as a policy entrepreneur. Particular attention is paid tomechanisms that are applied by the
Commission to extend its scope beyond its given formal competences to shape national reformagendas. The research inter‐
est is based on the assumption that the Commission is a ‘competence‐maximising rational actor’ (Pollack, 1997), whose
primary organisational goals are to expand the scope of Community competence and increase the Commission’s own
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nisms applied by the Commission under the European Semester to shape European and national reform agendas in areas
of sovereign policymaking competences of the member states.
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1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis,
several changes were made to the EU’s economic gov‐
ernance. In an immediate response to the crisis, the
EU Council agreed on far‐reaching institutional changes
with the reform packages of the ‘Six Pack’ (2011) and
‘Two Pack’ (2013). The reforms aim to strengthen fiscal
discipline, based on fiscal rules and macroeconomic indi‐
cators, and increase reform pressure in areas of national
competencies such as economic, fiscal, labour market,
and social policies.
The noteworthy changes enhanced the discretionary
authority of the Commission and the Council to push for
structural reforms in EU member states by addressing
macroeconomic imbalances (Erne, 2018, p. 237; Scharpf,
2014). Macroeconomic coordination was improved by
integrating soft‐governed policy issues, such as labour
market and social policy, into the regime of hard‐
governed fiscal policy (Barcevičius et al., 2014, pp. 34–35;
Copeland&Daly, 2015; Crespy &Menz, 2015; de la Porte
& Heins, 2015, p. 12). Many authors have described this
as a subordination of social policy objectives to the pri‐
orities of the latter, such as fiscal discipline and eco‐
nomic productivity (Bruff, 2017; Crespy & Menz, 2015,
pp. 199–200; Degryse et al., 2013, p. 70; Hacker, 2019,
p. 56; Syrovatka, 2016, p. 33; Wigger, 2015). Based on
that, the European Semester has become the focal point
for reform discussions in Europe that aim to achieve
the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy and the Euro‐Plus
Pact (de la Porte & Heins, 2015). The reform agenda
is substantiated by expertise‐driven Country‐Specific‐
Recommendations (CSRs). Deciding on CSRs, however,
is a collaborative process between Commission and
Council. The Commission formulates a draft and the
Council, on behalf of the member states, decides on
this soft law. To ensure the member states’ commit‐
ment and, thus, compliance with the CSRs, once passed,
it is crucial to involve them at every stage during the
European Semester.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 63–73 63
In 2015, under the Juncker presidency in the
Commission, several measures were introduced for fos‐
tering dialogue and information gathering with various
actors frommember states, primarilywith social partners
in accordance with guideline seven and principle eight
of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR; European
Commission, 2016). Important innovations include the
establishment of European Semester Officers (ESOs),
as part of Commission delegations in each member
state. The ESOs consult with national policymakers and
social partners separately in their fact‐finding missions,
discussing policy developments in their countries and
including this informationwhen drafting the annual CSRs.
Furthermore, the Commission’s Directorate‐General for
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) and
the Employment Committee (EMCO), representing the
member states, conduct regular tripartite joint reviews
with member states and national social partners on
Country Reports and CSRs (Eihmanis, 2017).
Although the Semester was suspended in response
to the Covid‐19 pandemic and its severe impact on the
economic development, a new instrument was intro‐
duced that might further increase the Commission’s role
as a policy entrepreneur. With Regulation 2021/241,
the EU Council agreed to establish a temporary
financial instrument under the budgetary line of the
‘NextGenerationEU,’ called the Recovery and Resilience
Facility. Member states benefit from the support of the
Recovery and Resilience Facility if their reform plans con‐
tribute to the Commission’s policy guidelines.
The underlying argument of this article is that the
paramount importance of these changes and their poten‐
tial impact on the political and bureaucratic function of
the Commission call for a reopening of the debate con‐
cerning the entrepreneurial role of the Commission in
facilitating structural reforms in areas of national compe‐
tence. The research contributes to this debate by exam‐
ining how the Commission uses its new role under the
European Semester to strategically exploit instruments
and strategies and enhance its ability to mobilise both
consensus for the Commission’s reform proposals and
commitment among supranational and national policy‐
makers. It does so despite institutional asymmetries and
structural power imbalances in decision‐making with its
inter‐institutional counterparts in the Council.
2. The Conceptual Framework: Mechanisms of Policy
Entrepreneurship in a Multilevel Governance
This article attempts to generate insights on the empiri‐
cal patterns bywhich the Commission exerts reformpres‐
sure on member states under the European Semester,
its role being limited to coordinating policy reforms in
areas that are entirely in the competence of the mem‐
ber states. This section starts from the premise that the
Commission benefited from changes made to the eco‐
nomic governance, which enabled it to become an effec‐
tive policy entrepreneur.
In the literature, a policy entrepreneur is described
as an individual or collective actor who might be based
within the government system (politicians or civil ser‐
vants) or outside it (interest groups; Gunn, 2017, p. 265).
A policy entrepreneur “seeks policy change that shifts
the status quo in given areas of public policy” (Mintrom,
2015, p. 103) by influencing key players in the deci‐
sion making (Cohen, 2012, p. 9). The European Semester
includes several innovations that have clearly enhanced
the Commission’s capacity to shape the reform agenda
in areas in the domain of member states, such as labour
market and social policy. Research has so far highlighted
the entrepreneurial role of the Commission in economic
policymaking (Chang & Monar, 2013; Ferrera, 2017),
focusing on the economic crisis and its impact on pol‐
icy change (Saurugger & Terpan, 2016) and analysing
the entrepreneurship of the Directorate‐General for
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) within the
Commission in economic governance (Maricut & Puetter,
2018; Schön‐Quinlivan & Scipioni, 2017). So far, there
has been no research done into the entrepreneurial role
of the Commission under the European Semester. This
article delves into the formulation and adoption of CSRs
as the instrument to shape national reform agenda and
contributes to the research area by identifying mecha‐
nisms that enhance the capacity of policy entrepreneurs
to shape policymaking in amultilevel governance setting.
The analytical framework borrows from the ‘multiple‐
streams framework’ of John Kingdon (2011), used for
a structured description of the involvement of policy
entrepreneurs in policy formation ranging from prob‐
lem identification to interpretation of problems and,
further, to the negotiation of specific policy responses.
The ‘multiple‐streams framework’ describes policymak‐
ing along three streams called ‘problem stream,’ ‘politics
stream,’ and ‘policy stream’ each offering distinct ‘policy
windows’ for policy entrepreneurs to shape policymak‐
ing (Petridou, 2014, p. 20). The problem stream focuses
on factors that have an influence on the identification
and interpretation of a policy problem and open a win‐
dow of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs. These fac‐
tors can include specific events that change the salience
of issues and the feedback on policies from stakehold‐
ers on policies. Furthermore, the creation of a techno‐
cratic procedures, based on strict assessment guidelines
and indicators, as well, can also have a huge impact on
the identification and interpretation of problems. Based
on these considerations, a first hypothesis is formulated
as follows:
H1: The more a problem identification and interpre‐
tation takes place within strict assessment guidelines
and indicators, the more likely it will be put on the
agenda by the policymakers.
Policy entrepreneurs benefit from a technocratic
approach in a veto‐prone setting. In technocratic gov‐
ernance regimes, proposals based on statistics and
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facts are difficult for policymakers to ignore or to argue
against without referring to empirical evidence. In any
case, policy entrepreneurs depend on detailed and
specific policy knowledge. Policy entrepreneurs are in
regular consultation with all kinds of political actors,
such as policymakers, interest groups, and other pol‐
icy entrepreneurs to gather information. Further, the
more a policy entrepreneur is able to gain far‐reaching
political support from other stakeholders, such as inter‐
est groups, the more a policy proposal is perceived as
legitimate and the harder it is for policymakers to ignore
or veto. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs actively seek to
form policy communities or epistemic communities, as
they are an important source of knowledge and legiti‐
macy (Hartlapp et al., 2010, p. 20).
H2: The more policy entrepreneurs gather country
and policy knowledge from relevant policy communi‐
ties, the more their proposals are perceived as more
legitimate.
As discussed by Kingdon (2011), the likelihood of a poli‐
cymaker to succeed in putting a policy problem on top of
the agenda relates to the political costs associatedwith it.
Political costs of any decision relate to the salience and
acceptability of a policy to the general public and are
expressed by public opinion, electoral votes, consent
by party clientele, and reputation of the policymaker
(Kingdon, 2011, pp. 66, 147). Therefore, policymakers
will prefer decisions with low political costs for them.
The less politicised a policy, the less the political costs.
Consequently, technocratic procedures and a low obliga‐
tion to implement decisions ease the adoption by policy‐
makers as their decision is of less consequence. Besides,
as discussed by Kingdon (2011, pp. 184–186), it is advis‐
able to focus on a manageable number of policy prob‐
lems, as a policymaker can only process a limited number
of projects at any given time. It might be the case that
policymakers pick policy problems of little political cost
and avoid the ones with high political costs. Therefore,
less is more and a policy entrepreneur should anticipate
policymakers’ constraints when raising policy proposals.
Furthermore, as stated by the ‘actor‐centred insti‐
tutionalism’ (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995), institutional
rules and values have an influence on how policy
entrepreneurs are empowered tomobilize their optional
power resources. Optional power resources are defined
here as the ability of actors to increase political costs for
policymakers in case of deviant action by legal enforce‐
ment powers as well as to mobilise peer pressure (Treib,
2015). The decision‐making rules play a crucial role in
this context. It matters if it is possible for the decision‐
makers to amend or reject a proposal and if the deci‐
sion to be agreed is vague and non‐binding rather than
strict and of binding force, with possible sanctions in
place. The ability to mobilize peer pressure is another
power resource that is a result of shared beliefs between
the policy entrepreneur and relevant political actors and
epistemic communities (Scharpf, 2000, p. 77). In a multi‐
level setting, the decision‐making includes several actors
of distinct political power. Consequently, if the policy
entrepreneur shares its belief with the more powerful
actors, peer pressure might evoke and ease the consent
of reluctant policymakers. A good example for asymmet‐
ric imbalance of power in governance regimes is the
‘EU core‐periphery model’ at the member state level.
The argument here is as follows: If the Commission’s CSRs
address member states in the periphery, it might be easy
tomobilise peer pressure among themore powerful core
member states. With that in mind, our third hypothesis
is claimed:
H3: The less politicised and the less binding a decision
is the more likely policymakers will vote in favour of
the peer group.
On the contrary, the more controversial a policy and
the more precise in wording as well as binding in the
scope of action needed, the more hesitant decision mak‐
ers will be to agree. Conversely, this means that a policy
entrepreneur needs to seek for ownership first, to make
a policy effective. The main instruments for generating
ownership are: firstly, gaining the consent of policymak‐
ers to the procedure and the indicators to assess policy
developments; secondly, anticipating policy preferences
as well as general preferences of policymakers and using
these for the policy entrepreneur’s strategic advantage;
thirdly, ensuring significant involvement of policymakers
in the identification and interpretation of policy prob‐
lems as well when formulating the policy proposal. That
means that policymakers have to have a chance to inter‐
vene or argue at a preliminary stage. However, once a pol‐
icy proposal is adopted, policy entrepreneurs will refer to
the ownership of policymakers if the policy is to be imple‐
mented. If policymakers are notwilling to do so, their rep‐
utation will be permanently damaged.
H4: Policy entrepreneurs seek to involve policymak‐
ers at every stage of the policy formation aiming to
increase their ownership of the proposal when it is
due to be implemented.
The final stream of the ‘multiple‐stream framework’ is
the policy stream, which focuses on the formation and
negotiation of specific policy responses. This stream is
more policy oriented and here the ‘coupling process’
(Kingdon, 2011, pp. 180–181) comes into play. This con‐
cept is applied by policy entrepreneurs to shape the
agenda setting by presenting their favourite policy to
the policymakers as a solution to the detected problem
at the right moment (Knaggård, 2015, p. 450). This is
because it is quite helpful if the policy entrepreneur is
able to influence the process of identifying and interpret‐
ing policy problems and to narrow policy options down
to a limited set of possible solutions (Ackrill et al., 2013).
This relates to a specific technocratic capture potential
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that a policy entrepreneur has to define specific assess‐
ment indicators, use procedural rules to put its interpre‐
tation first on the agenda, and mobilise peer pressure.
H5: The higher the technocratic capture potential of
policy entrepreneurs, the more likely they are able to
streamline policy debates according to their own pol‐
icy preferences by coupling identified problems with
the right policy solution.
Figure 1 summarizes the findings of the theoretical dis‐
cussion by structuring the causal mechanisms in relation
to the distinct stage of the policymaking and the differ‐
ences between mechanisms based on procedural rules
and on political interaction.
In the following sections, the theoretical claims are
qualified by an inference analysis on applied mecha‐
nisms of policy entrepreneurship, as demonstrated in
Figure 1. These mechanisms are tested against the
practice of economic governance under the European
Semester. To achieve this, the empirical analysis relies
on the findings from 14 semi‐directed expert interviews
carried out with senior officials at the Commission, advi‐
sory committees to the Council (EMCO) and involved
social partners between December 2020 and May 2021
(the list of interviewees is in the Supplementary
File). Interviewees were asked to describe how the
Commission works under the rules of the European
Semester and how it cooperates with the Council, the
member states executives, and social partners, in order
to increase the significance of its policy proposals.
Furthermore, themain findings from the interviewswere
discussed with leading academics in the field of inter‐
est to qualify the arguments and conclusions made in
the article. The author would like to thank Amy Verdun,
Bart Vanhercke, Sebastiano Sabato, Jörg Haas and Felix
Syrovatka for their helpful comments.
3. Empirical Analysis
In this section, the author takes a ‘mechanismic perspec‐
tive’ (Gerring, 2008) by empirically uncovering the causal
pathways on how the Commission exerts influence as
a policy entrepreneur. The empirical analysis scruti‐
nises the rule change implemented with the ‘Six Pack’
(2011) and ‘Two Pack’ (2013), the reforms to the pro‐
cedure at the beginning of the Juncker Commission
(2015) and, finally, the establishment of the Recovery
and Resilience Facility in 2021. The theoretical argument
is that, with the changes made to the economic gover‐
nance, the Commission’s role as a policy entrepreneur
was strengthened as follows. Firstly, the commission
gained a higher direct impact on the European reform
agenda due to new treaty‐based competences under
the European Semester. Secondly, the Commissionmade
strategic endeavours to extend its scope for shaping
policy decisions beyond formal rules and in areas of
national competence such as the labour market and
social policy. The empirical analysis sheds light on the
strategic endeavours of the Commission to use its
optional power resources within the rules of procedure
and political interaction. The research analyses strategic
attempts by the Commission to increase its influence on
policymaking by scrutinizing its role in the procedure and
its interaction with other actors along three stages of
the policy cycle: 1) policy identification and interpreta‐
tion, 2) policy formulation and negotiation, and 3) pol‐
icy implementation.
3.1. Policy Identification and Interpretation:
Streamlining Policy Debates
The European Semester starts with two main moni‐
toring reports: The Alert Mechanism Report and the
Joint Employment Report annexed to the Annual Growth
Survey. The Alert Mechanism Report includes the find‐
ings of an examination by the Commission based on
a scoreboard of 14 macroeconomic indicators. Specific
thresholds are set, in order to define the appropri‐
ate development in a country. If a country’s develop‐
ment is below or above this threshold, the Commission
conducts ‘In‐Depth Reviews.’ Consequently, countries
with severe macroeconomic imbalances could face an
‘Excessive Imbalance Procedure.’ Thus, indicators play a
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Figure 1. The ‘multilevel policy entrepreneur’ mechanisms of policy reform.
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crucial role in shaping reform agendas. Although they
are perceived as being technocratic in form and objec‐
tive, the agreement on them has been highly political
and often a compromise between France and Germany
(Bokhorst, 2019, pp. 118–120). The Commission per‐
forms the scrutiny based on the indicators but is free to
interpret the findings and thus uses them to frame pol‐
icy discourses. Its conclusion is published in the so‐called
Country Reports. They serve as the basis for tailor‐made
CSRs for member states that address reform demands
in economic, fiscal, employment or social policy areas.
Member states are requested to implement themwithin
12–18 months. The Commission’s draft CSRs have to
receive the consent of the Council to be adopted.
The Commission’s interpretation, therefore, has to
be backed by specific policy and country knowledge.
For the former, DG EMPL on behalf of the Commission
has strengthened its intelligence‐gathering and analyt‐
ical capacity through the development of new moni‐
toring instruments and the intensification of multilat‐
eral surveillance by establishing different benchmark‐
ing tools such as the Europe 2020 Joint Assessment
Framework for monitoring the Employment Guidelines,
the Social Protection Performance Monitor and the
Employment Performance Monitor. The Employment
Performance Monitor is a bi‐annual joint report of
DG EMPL together with EMCO, which summarises
the assessment of the Europe 2020 Joint Assessment
Framework and identifies key challenges. Another impor‐
tant innovation has been the establishment of the EPSR
in 2017, based on 20 principals. Since 2018, the Joint
Employment Report is drawn up according to twelve
Social Scoreboard indicators based on these 20 princi‐
ples. Although the DG EMPL and the Council configura‐
tion on Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer
Affairs (EPSCO) together agree on using EPSR as the refer‐
ence for social CSRs, member states seem very reticent.
As Hacker (2019, p. 55) found out, only eleven member
states consider them when formulating their National
Reform Programme (NRP). In addition, DG EMPL pub‐
lished several proposals to emphasise its reform agenda,
which were discussed, monitored, and reviewed within
the European Semester. Foremost among thesewere the
‘Employment Package’ (2012), the ‘Compact for Growth
and Jobs’ (2012), the ‘Youth Employment Package’ (2012)
and the ‘Social Investment Package’ (2013). Furthermore,
individual DGs also have their ownmonitoring reports to
address their specific policy demands. A good example is
the debate on the effective and statutory retirement age.
DG EMPL and DG ECFIN each provide their own exper‐
tise on this issue.Whereas DG EMPL produces a so‐called
adequacy report every two years, which is adopted at
the advisory committee to the Council EPSCO, DG ECFIN
draws up the so‐called ageing report to emphasise its
own agenda on this issue.
With the Juncker Commission (2014–2019), the
Commission intensified the information exchange with
political communities (Haas, 1992; Zito, 2001). The
Commission opened several channels for gathering
country‐specific information, and for discussing findings
of the annual monitoring, expressed in the so‐called
Country Reports. Themost important of these are annual
fact‐finding missions and the establishment of respon‐
sible contact persons at the Commissions delegation
in each country, the so‐called ESOs. In addition, the
Commission conducts bipartite and tripartite meetings
with country representatives to gain all‐encompassing
information as well as to increase its ownership with
the CSRs. The involvement and consultation of national
stakeholders, especially social partners, are a crucial
source of expertise and legitimacy that strengthens the
Commission’s role as a policy entrepreneur (Interview
DG EMPL #1 and SECGEN #6; Tricart, 2019). As for
the involvement of trade unions, the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC) is most notably involved in
ex‐ante consultation when drafting the Annual Growth
Survey and the Joint Employment Report (Interview
ETUC #7). The ETUC is also invited to meet with the
Troika of the EU during the informal EPSCO Council.
Their cooperation was formalised in a cooperation pro‐
tocol in 2014 (Interview DG EMPL #1). Furthermore, the
Commission financially supported the launch of Trade
Union Semester Liaison Officers (TUSLOs) for a more
streamlined communication. TUSLOs are the main repre‐
sentatives of their organisation in coordinating Semester
policies at the EU level, especially within the ETUC, and
in acting as a central contact at the national level.
The traditional arenas for neo‐corporatist prac‐
tices at the EU level are the European Economic
and Social Committee (EESC) and the European Social
Dialogue (ESD). The EESC has acknowledged the grow‐
ing importance of the European Semester and replaced
its Europe 2020 Steering Committee with the European
Semester Ad hoc Group. The European Semester Ad hoc
Group coordinates the work of the EESC sections and
takes a position on Semester documents by using
existing access to actors around EU’s economic gover‐
nance. The ESD, however, is not used for consultation
between European social partners on issues related to
the European Semester. In fact, the EESC and ESD play
no decisive role because the consultation between social
partners and the Commission still takes place bilater‐
ally (Sabato, 2020). Although multiple points of access
along the multilevel system are open to social partners
within the European Semester, the most effective one
is still the national social dialogue. But its significance
has diminished especially in countries that enjoy a strong
social dialogue anyway, such as Austria, Germany, and
Finland (Kirov & Markova, 2020; Pavolini & Natili, 2020;
Sabato, 2020).
Furthermore, in light of the limited enforcement
authority in labour market and social policy domains,
a deliberative and inclusive approach is applied to
increase national ownership and politicisation of CSRs
with contributing to effective compliance with CSRs.
This approach counteracts the practice of behind‐closed‐
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doors decision‐making on NRPs and the dominance of
finance ministers. As a result, the Commission strength‐
ened its efforts to involve social partners by calling on the
national governments to consult social partners more
effectively in drawing up NRPs and the National Job Plan
(Eurofound, 2019). After this, governments were obliged
to annex the views of social partners to those documents.
In any case, most governments are bypassing social part‐
ners when drafting their NRPs, including in the current
recovery plan (Interview ECOSOC #9 and TUSLO #6).
These measures are interpreted as endeavours to
politicise CSRs at the national level with the help of
social partners and, hence, increase reform pressure
on national governments (Erne, 2019). Moreover, the
interventionist tendencies associated with the European
Semester regime also favour the politicization along
national rather than transnational class lines (Jordan
et al., 2020, p. 3). It is therefore questionable whether
the current institutionalisation of civil society partici‐
pation offers an appropriate remedy to the problems
of democracy and accountability from which the EU
suffers. The vertical surveillance under the European
Semester put countries in competition with one another,
which implicitly constitutes a deterrent to transna‐
tional Euro‐corporatism. Effective interest intermedia‐
tion and influence presuppose a shared agenda accumu‐
lated within the respective social partner organisations.
Nevertheless, different national circumstances make it
difficult to develop a joint agenda at the ETUC. The main
cleavages are based on the different economic models
in each country, divided between those that are more
demand‐side or supply‐side oriented. In particular, trade
unions in manymember states are sceptical about recog‐
nising the European Semester as a legitimate policy pro‐
cess. Several interviewees from trade unions (Interview
TUSLO #12 and TUSLO #8), underlined the demand for
the democratisation of the European Semester by includ‐
ing the European parliament as well as national parlia‐
ments into the decision making. Current consultations
of social partners are merely on an ad‐hoc basis and not
seen as effective for having a say in the agenda building;
a regular dialogue would be needed for that.
Trade unions, in particular, accept DG EMPL as an
honest broker for their interests (Interview TUSLO #12).
Nevertheless, trade unions criticise the limitation in
scope and regularity of their interaction (Sabato et al.,
2017). They criticise a lack of access to other thematic
DGs involved in the process, like DG ECFIN or SECGEN
(Interview ETUC #7). Furthermore, trade unions propose
the expansion of economic governance to include other
policy areas, such as environment, industry, and educa‐
tion, in order to discuss employees’ interests in a more
comprehensive manner (Interview TUSLO #12). In addi‐
tion, the interaction with the Commission is described
as asymmetric, spontaneous, and without any commit‐
ment. As described in the interviews, DG EMPL con‐
sults trade unions proactively and regularly. Trade unions
are invited to tripartite talks during fact‐finding missions
and to discussions of Country Reports and CSRs. Often,
trade unions are consulted on an ad‐hoc basis, when DG
EMPL needs specific information (Interview TUSLO #12).
Although trade unions deliver requested information,
they regret the absence of an ex‐post dialogue as well
as any commitment to their proposals by DG EMPL and,
thus, their lack of impact on final decisions (Interview
TUSLO #12). Consequently, social partners often feel
instrumentalised by DGs’ agendas and do not see a reli‐
able cooperation, because relevant transparent proce‐
dures are missing (Interview TUSLO #12).
To sum up, it is the technocratic notion set up by the
assessment guidelines and the competence given to the
Commissions as well as their regular consultation with
social partners which strengthens the Commission’s pro‐
posals and thus, clearly shapes the decision‐making of
the Council on CSRs.
3.2. Policy Formulation and Negotiation: The
Commission’s True Agenda‐Setting Power
The insistence on the implementation of a revamped
integrated coordination and surveillance framework
reflects both the extension of the scope of coordina‐
tion, which is due to an expansion to include labour
market and social policy areas, and its intensification,
which is due to enhanced surveillance and peer pressure
(Maricut&Puetter, 2018, p. 198). The reformpackages of
the ‘Six Pack’ (2011) and ‘Two Pack’ (2013) provide cru‐
cial competences to the Commission to administer the
European Semester and to prepare the basis for any deci‐
sion by the Council. The Commission’s preferences are
substantiated by formulating the CSRs. CSR formation at
the level of the Commission is built upon expertise and
transparent indicator‐based monitoring. Apparent inde‐
pendent expertise, based on information‐gathering and
indicator‐based interpretation, serves as the justification
of CSRs (Interview DG EMPL #1). CSRs find their legit‐
imisation through their reference to other public moni‐
toring reports, like the Alert Mechanism Report and the
Joint Employment Report annexed to the Annual Growth
Survey, and benchmarks formulated in the Europe 2020
and Euro‐Plus Pact. Soft‐law, used to coordinate labour
market and social policies, was merely integrated into
the logic of hard governance of fiscal policy (Kahn‐Nisser,
2015) and the coordination process became more char‐
acterised by ‘command‐and‐control’ attitudes whereby
“national diversity is often placed within strict limits
with high levels of supranational policy prescription”
(Dawson, 2015, p. 984).
One widely discussed argument is that the empow‐
erment of the Commission is an attempt by ‘core’
member states (Gräbner et al., 2018, p. 19)—such as
Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark—to utilise the
Commission as a strategic agency to discipline mem‐
ber states into maintaining sound public finances and
push them to implement requested structural reforms
according to an ordoliberal agenda (Ryner, 2015). In this
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view, the European Semester is intended to help in
putting pressure on indebted member states (e.g., Italy,
Spain, Portugal, and Greece) to conduct reforms in the
policy areas that account for the main shares of bud‐
getary expenditures, such as unemployment compensa‐
tion and social allowances. Furthermore, the argument
runs, these reforms are supposed to contribute to the
EU’s objective to gain productivity by, for example, ensur‐
ing lower unit labour costs and higher flexibility on the
labour market. Overall, the article argues that core mem‐
ber states facilitate peer pressure on the periphery to
accept the new economic governance regime and its pol‐
icy objectives by integrating its economicmodels into the
logic of the European Semester. Furthermore, in 2015,
as part of broader efforts to streamline the European
Semester, the number of CSRswas reduced to two to five
overall recommendations per country to increase reform
pressure on prioritised CSRs (Vanhercke et al., 2015). It is
thought that putting emphasis on the most prioritised
CSRs is a good strategy to evoke peer pressure in the tra‐
dition of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) strat‐
egy of blaming and shaming concerning the monitoring
of progress on pre‐defined benchmarks.
It should be emphasised that the Commission draws
on its technocratic capture potential through substantial
in‐house policy and country expertise, built up through
administering the coordination of the Lisbon and Europe
2020 process under the OMC, which relies on a delibera‐
tive, consensus‐seeking, and expertise‐driven approach.
The Commission benefits from its “familiarity with the
challenge of debating its positionswith the economic pol‐
icy actors under the Integrated Guidelines of the Lisbon
Strategy” (Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018, p. 165).
With the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000,
the Commission was entrusted with the facilitation
of policy coordination among member states on the
OMC‐principles. The purpose of this coordination is
to harmonize member states’ policies along mutually
agreed benchmarks while guaranteeing them their sole
sovereign power to govern in these policy areas. In 2010,
the ill‐fated Lisbon Strategy was succeeded by the
ten‐year reform agenda Europe 2020, which defines
five numerical headline targets, mainly addressing social
cohesion. In addition, member states agreed on the
Euro‐Plus Pact that addresses more than 50 reform pro‐
posals in twelve key areas aiming to increase productiv‐
ity and economic growth in the European Single Market.
Member states are encouraged to include them into
their annual NRP and have to report to the Commission
on the progress achieved and on the challenges encoun‐
tered. The policy coordination under the OMC clearly
falls short of expectations. It is the Commission’s task
to identify and negotiate on jointly agreed benchmarks
and monitor the progress made by member states in ful‐
filling them. But the Commission lacks any enforcement
authority under the OMC. Any policy change in themem‐
ber states relies mainly on soft power as policy learning
through the exchange of best practices and expertise.
One way of increasing compliance pressure is to
incorporate unbinding recommendations into the logic
of what appears to be hard governance. Subsequently,
macroeconomic coordination builds upon a precisemon‐
itoring ofmember states compliancewith defined bench‐
marks and entails enforcement duties in case of pol‐
icy failure. It is the Commission who is in charge of
monitoring member states’ macroeconomic develop‐
ment and identifying severe imbalances. Each year,
the Commission publishes its results and clusters coun‐
tries according to the extent of their macroeconomic
imbalances. This is reminiscent of the mechanism of
blaming and shaming that has been used under the
OMC. Nevertheless, the Commission’s role as policy
entrepreneur benefits from the changes made by the
Semester’s procedural framework. Although the coop‐
eration between the Commission (DG EMPL) and the
EPSCO Council has gradually been shaped by institu‐
tional asymmetries based on distinct legal contexts of
their competences, it has turned into a collaborative
setting, facilitated by the consensus‐seeking nature of
the advisory committee to the Council EMCO (Zeitlin &
Vanhercke, 2018, p. 151). Therefore, the EMCO is seen
as an important resource for the Commission to evoke
peer pressure as decisions are made collectively and on
the basis of the Commission’s evidence‐based problem
interpretation (Interview DG EMPL #1 and SECGEN #6).
The consensus at EMCO is a crucial resource of owner‐
ship (Interview DG EMPL #1 and EMCO #2).
Interaction between theDG EMPL of the Commission
and national governments takes place at two main
venues. First, they seek consultation with national gov‐
ernments during its annual fact‐finding missions while
formulating its Country Reports. These fact‐finding mis‐
sions are organised by the ESOs at the Commission del‐
egations in the member states and include dialogues
with national governments and administrations as well
as social partners. Second, the advisory EMCO prepares
EPSCO conclusions on the Annual Growth Survey (includ‐
ing the Joint Employment Report) and on CSRs in the
employment field. The EMCO is a senior expert com‐
mittee that consists of representatives from member
states and is supported byDGEMPL. EMCOenjoys crucial
consensus‐generating capacities and draws its strength
from close and regular cooperation between senior
experts from member states’ ministries and DG EMPL.
Two sub‐groups support it: the policy analysis group,
which provides advice on EMCOwork, and the indicators
group, which carries out technical work related to the
indicators that are used to monitor the implementation
of EU’s employment strategy. Their role is seen as very
important, as indicators are used to justify policy recom‐
mendations. To conclude, member states are involved at
various stages of the Semester cycle. They adopt indica‐
tors, used to identify macroeconomic imbalances, have
to adopt CSRs, and can veto an excessive imbalance pro‐
cedure. But the process is highly standardised and tech‐
nocratic. Therefore, once the process has started, it is
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hardly possible for a member state to veto on CSRs.
Changes to the Commissions’ proposal on CSRs need a
doublemajority in the Council, which is virtually unreach‐
able without a good reason (Interview SECGEN #6). And,
although they are not binding, once in place, it is almost
impossible to remove CSRs from the agenda and, thus,
member states have to reflect on them until they are
implemented (Interview ETUC #7). As another intervie‐
wee points out “once on the list, it is difficult to get them
off the list” (Interview TUSLO #8).
To conclude this section, it is very difficult to reject
or change a proposal made by the Commission. Most
of its proposals gain support by the core and creditor
states for two reasons. First, CSRs gain impact in case of
severe macroeconomic imbalances. Most of the states
who face severe macroeconomic imbalances are from
the so‐called European periphery. Second, indicators
used for the assessment are mainly negotiated among
core member states and, thus, follow their policy objec‐
tives. To sum up, it is about the Commission’s techno‐
cratic capture potential to be able to emancipate from
core member states’ agenda.
3.3. Policy Implementation: How to Ensure the
Significance of CSRs
This section asks about the significance of CSRs on
national reform agendas, as their proposed effective‐
ness has a direct impact on the decision‐making. The
argument here is, the more binding a CSR, the more
difficult to get it through the Council. Although the
Commission enjoys far‐reaching agenda‐setting compe‐
tences, it reveals little about its effective implementa‐
tion into national reform agendas. Due to a database
provided by the Commission’s Economic Governance
Support Unit of the Directorate‐General for Internal
Policies, only 51.6 percent of CSRs were satisfyingly
implemented in average between 2012 and 2019.
Furthermore, the compliance rate declined from 71 per‐
cent in 2012 to 39.8 percent in 2019 (Directorate‐General
for Internal Policies, 2020). The lack of enforcement
capabilities fits into the debate on the ‘post‐Maastricht
integration paradox,’ which states that member states
seek closer integration in order to address undeniable
policy interdependencies, but without transferring real
powers such as legislative competences to suprana‐
tional actors (Maricut & Puetter, 2018, p. 206). Instead,
they prefer collective agreement on coordination objec‐
tives by enhancing the consensus‐generation capacity
of high‐level intergovernmental forums in areas out‐
side the classic community method—namely economic
governance, employment, and social affairs (Maricut &
Puetter, 2018, p. 195).
Some of the CSRs themselves have gained more
significance because of a legal context referring to
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and/or the
Stability and Growth Pact and their corrective arms
‘Excessive Imbalance Procedure’ for the former and
‘Excessive Deficit Procedure’ for the latter. As a study
by Bekker (2015, p. 13) and Maricut and Puetter (2018,
p. 205) has shown, at least 50 percent of social CSRs
are addressed under a legal context. Member states
are requested to implement them within 12–18 months.
The national Ministries of Finance are primarily respon‐
sible for implementation because most of the proposed
reforms have implications for the budget (Interview DG
EMPL #1; Kudrna & Wasserfallen, 2020). Furthermore, a
positive conditionality as well might help to increase the
compliance with CSRs. A good example is the recently
establishedResilience and Recovery Facility that provides
financial assistance for funding the implementation of
reforms who address CSRs (Interview TUSLO #6).
Apart from that, the Commission puts efforts to
increase the consent amongmember states under a veto‐
prone procedure. The challenge, therefore, is to formu‐
late CSRs that get the ownership of member states. This
includes a regular communication relying on data‐based
expertise and specific policy knowledge. To enhance
national ownership of the supranational reform agenda,
the Commission underpins CSRs through wide‐ranging
consultationwith national administrations, ensuring that
CSRs are robust enough to withstand scrutiny (Verdun &
Zeitlin, 2018, p. 145). The governance of the Semester
has likewise become less hierarchical and more interac‐
tive, while the CSRs, especially in the social and employ‐
ment field, have become less uniform, less prescriptive,
and better adapted to national circumstances (Zeitlin &
Vanhercke, 2018, p. 168).
Finally, since 2015, the Commission involves social
partners more closely in the Semester cycle. Forming
political communities with national social partners,
which provide the Commission with specific policy and
country knowledge, should also help to politicise the
technocratic Semester Cycle on the member state level
and mobilise publicity of CSRs and, thus, bring them on
the national reform agenda. To conclude here, CSRs are
not binding, but they raise attention to crucial shortcom‐
ings of a state and, thus, may be referenced in domes‐
tic political debates by political actors to blame the gov‐
ernment or to increase reform pressure. Currently, the
politicisation is the highest in countries of the periphery
(e.g., Italy) that face severe reform pressure by legally
binding CSRs.
The main conclusion to be made here is that CSRs
linked to severe macroeconomic imbalances are of bind‐
ing force with possible legal consequences in case of a
lack of compliance by national policymaking. The chal‐
lenge, however, is to gain impact on the policymaking in
all member states, despite the legal context of the CSRs.
On one hand, the Commission aims to increase national
ownership with the Semester procedure and the CSRs.
The involvement of social partners, on the other hand,
should help to increase political costs for policymakers
at the national level in case of a lack of implementation
(see also Ferrera, 2017).
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4. Conclusion
It was the aim of this article to uncover the entrepren‐
eurial role gained by the Commission with the reform of
the economic governance. Initially, therefore, a theoret‐
ical model of distinct mechanisms (Figure 1) by which a
policy entrepreneur might shape multi‐level policymak‐
ingwas developed in the first place. Themodel and delin‐
eated hypothesis were used to investigate Commission’s
entrepreneurial role under the European Semester.
The empirical analysis was mainly based on document
analysis and semi‐structured expert interviews.
First, it was hypothesised that policy entrepreneurs
are more successful in agenda‐setting when this pro‐
cess is highly technocratic. The analysis has shown that
the European Semester procedure is highly standard‐
ised. Political debates on the formulation of CSRs are
based on indicators and specific policy as well as coun‐
try knowledge. Although such technocratic procedures
seem to be less politicized, the author underlines the
high degree of politicisation when setting specific indi‐
cators that streamline policy debates within prioritized
norms and values. Furthermore, the Commission was
able to increase its technocratic capture potential by
juxtaposing the political logic of hard governance with
streamlining agenda building in areas of soft governance
on the ‘command and control’ principle. Its impact relies
on its empowered role under the European Semester
regime, in which it is in charge of identifying and inter‐
preting policy problems as well as offering justified solu‐
tions substantiated by CSRs. This is illustrated by clear
benchmarks, assessment frameworks, and monitoring
reports. Second, and connected to the Commissions’
technocratic capture potential, reference is made to
the gained policy and country knowledge that forms
the Commission’s expertise. Of importance are regu‐
lar and meaningful consultations with social partners,
which have been intensified since 2015 and strengthen
Commission’s political power when discussing its pro‐
posed CSRs.
Third, peer pressure is an important factor under the
European Semester. The research has shown some evi‐
dence that the European Semester is of asymmetric sig‐
nificance to member states, depending on whether the
latter are confronted by severe budget and/or macroe‐
conomic imbalances. As discussed by Ryner (2015) and
others, initially, the Commission was empowered in
the economic governance to serve the agenda of core
member states. Nonetheless, our findings show that
since the Commission under Juncker (2014–2019), the
Commission has emancipated itself from core member
states’ agendas and developed its own policy priorities
such as substantiated in the EPSR. Nevertheless, the
research lacks any evidence so far that the Commission
is able to mobilise specific peer pressure in the Council
to its favour. Apart from that, we still face a huge politi‐
cization in the Council when it comes to decisions on the
corrective arms of the Semester.
Our fourth hypothesis refers to Commission’s aim to
increase the compliancewith CSRs atmember state level.
The Commission interacts closely with national govern‐
ments and includes them at every stage of the agenda
building to gain their consent to the final CSRs. The aim
is to increase national ownership to the fullest extent
and to de‐politicize reform debates at the EU‐level by
means of expertise‐driven proposals. On the other hand,
our final finding refers to the Commission’s attempt
to enable a meaningful involvement by social partners
at the national level. Although on a weaker level, evi‐
dence is given that the Commission seeks, by the involve‐
ment of stakeholders, to politicize CSRs inmember states.
The Commission’s strategic aim is to bring CSRs onto the
national reform agenda and, thus, increase the effective‐
ness of macroeconomic policy coordination under the
European Semester.
To conclude, this research contributes to the litera‐
ture by shedding light on how the Commission expands
its impact on national policymaking beyond its given
competences. The elaborated model should help to
guide further research into the mechanisms applied to
reach effective impact on national reform agendas.
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